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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
I. Whether student speech outside the school setting is governed by Tinker v. Des Moines 
Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) and its progeny.  
 
II. If so, whether application of the Tinker standard and its progeny allow Respondent’s 
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BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT 
 
OPINIONS BELOW 
The Opinion and Order of the Fifteenth Circuit (R. at 21-22) is unreported.  The United 
States District Court for the Southern District of Everystate’s Opinion and Order Denying 
Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction (R. at 15-18) is unreported. 
 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifteenth Circuit entered judgement in favor of 
Respondent on March 16, 2016. (R. at 22).  Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari on 
April 15, 2016. (R. at 23).  This Court granted the petition on January 6, 2017 (R. at 24).  This 
Court’s jurisdiction rests on 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) (2012).  
 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 A district court’s fact findings and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from them are 
reviewed for clear error.  Its legal conclusions are reviewed de novo.  
 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED 
The First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution states:  
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free 
exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the 
people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
I. Facts of the Case 
The Nero Unified School District (“District”) operates all public primary and secondary 
schools in the city of Everycity, Everystate, including Nero High School (“Nero”). (R. at 3).  Nero 
is dedicated to the academic and social instruction of the city’s youth, and has been entrusted with 
instilling core values which will enable its students to mature into responsible adults. (R. at 12).  
Michael Naranjo is an eighteen-year-old high-school student at Nero. (R. at 6).  He is an 
outstanding young man and straight-A student who maintains a 4.0 GPA, takes advanced 
placement classes, and is captain of the high school’s varsity basketball team. (R. at 6). 
On September 9, 2015, while off-campus and during out-of-school hours, Michael used his 
personal computer to create a Facebook group called “Nero is Anti-Gay.” (R. at 3).  Nero had 
recently hired a teacher who writes an anti-LGBT blog under a pseudonym. (R. at 2).  Clearly 
upset and disappointed by the school’s and, by extension, the District’s apparent support of anti-
LGBT views, Michael created the group to express his opinions about the District’s hiring 
decisions and to provide a forum for other concerned students to share their opinions as well. (R. 
at 6).  
Facebook is a publicly accessible social networking website which is not in any way 
associated with Nero, Michael, or Everystate. (R. at 6).  Although Michael did not advertise or 
display the group webpage at school, the group became popular. (R. at 6).  The group consisted of 
his entire senior class, as well as students from the school’s lower grades. (R. at 21).  Members 
posted comments, links to other webpages, pictures, digital drawings, and video clips, but Michael 
did not have any control over the postings. (R. at 6).  Most of the posts were harmless depictions 
of average teenage lives, but some of the postings were somewhat provocative and controversial. 
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(R. at 15).  For instance, a few of Michael’s postings depicted school teachers and administrators 
in sexually explicit drawings. (R. at 15).  
The contents of the Facebook group came to the attention of school authorities when a 
teacher found a printout of one of the provocative drawings posted by Michael in his classroom. 
(R. at 15).  Michael did not intend the drawing to be shown on campus and does not know who 
brought it to campus. (R. at 7).  The drawing unexpectedly made its way to campus without his 
knowledge. (R. at 6).  Nero has not contested this. (R. at 15).  Shortly thereafter, on or about 
September 14, Nero administrators demanded that Michael delete the Facebook group. (R. at 4).  
When Michael refused, the District held a disciplinary hearing and suspended him. (R. at 2).  On 
September 28, 2015, Michael was officially suspended, subject to his deletion of the Facebook 
group. (R. at 4).  The suspension remains in effect until the Facebook group is deleted. (R. at 2).  
 
II. Disposition of the Case 
Plaintiff-Respondent, Michael Naranjo, filed a civil action against the Nero Unified School 
District (Nero), Defendant-Petitioner, in the United States for the Southern District of Everystate 
on October 7, 2015. (R. at 3-4).  In his complaint, Naranjo alleged Nero violated his First 
Amendment rights and sought equitable relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (R. at 3-4).  
Specifically, Naranjo alleged that Nero violated his First Amendment rights when it prohibited his 
Facebook group (web page) and its postings and suspended him for refusing to take down the web 
page. (R. at 3-4).  Nero answered the complaint on October 12, 2015, requesting Naranjo’s request 
for relief be denied. (R. at 5).  On October 30, 2015, the District Court rendered judgement in favor 




Naranjo timely appealed the judgement of the District Court to the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Fifteenth Circuit on November 1, 2015. (R. at 19).  On March 16, 2016, the Court 
of Appeals reversed the judgement of the District Court, holding that Tinker and its progeny do 
not apply to the case, and remanded the case with instructions that the District Court should apply 
ordinary First Amendment analysis. (R. at 21-22).  Nero filed a petition for writ of certiorari on 
April 15, 2016. (R. at 23).  This Court granted certiorari on January 6, 2017. (R. at 24). 
 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
Student speech is protected by the First Amendment of the United States Constitution, 
but speech within the school setting may be governed by Tinker and its progeny.  The application 
of Tinker and its progeny are limited to on-campus speech, off-campus speech which reaches the 
school setting, and off-campus speech which is violent, threatening, or harassing and 
intentionally directed at the school community.  The application of Tinker and its progeny in 
Michael’s case does not enable the Nero Unified School District to regulate Michael’s speech, 
because Michael’s speech does not meet the standard of Tinker and is not characteristic of the 
type of speech which may be restricted under Fraser, Kuhlmeier, or Morse. 
 
ARGUMENTS 
I. If Student Speech Outside the School Setting is not of a Violent, Threatening, or 
Harassing Nature and is not Intentionally Directed at the School, the Speech should be 
Governed by the First Amendment, not Tinker and its Progeny 
 
A. Student Speech is Protected under the First Amendment 
All citizens of the United States are granted certain individual rights and liberties, such as 
the freedom of speech, by the First Amendment of the United States Constitution.  Though not 
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absolute, the right to free speech is protected against punishment or censorship, unless it is likely 
to produce a “clear and present danger” of a substantive evil which “rises far above” reasonable 
levels of public annoyance, inconvenience, or unrest. Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 
4 (1949).  Thus, one is free to voice his opinions and share his thoughts, even if others disagree 
with, or are offended by, it. See, Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (Vietnam War protestor 
who wore a “Fuck the Draft” jacket in a courthouse was protected by the First Amendment). 
 Accordingly, students also have a right to free speech, as they do not shed their 
constitutional rights “at the schoolhouse gate.” Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 
U.S. 503, 506 (1969).  Therefore, when a school seeks to extend its “dominion beyond these 
bounds,” it must comply with the same “constitutional commands” that bind other government 
institutions. Thomas v. Bd. of Ed., Granville Cent. Sch. Dist., 607 F.2d 1043, 1045 (2d Cir. 1979). 
See also, Burch v. Barker, 861 F.2d 1149, 1150 (9th Cir. 1988) (a school policy that effectively 
curtails communications among students which are not perceivably affiliated with the school 
violates the First Amendment); Tinker, 393 U.S. at 511 (prohibition of students wearing black 
armbands at school in protest of the Vietnam War abridges students’ First Amendment rights); 
Burnside v. Bryars, 363 F.2d 744, 748-49 (5th Cir. 1966) (a regulation banning the wearing of 
“freedom buttons” at school is an unnecessary infringement on students’ right to free speech). 
Similarly, the First Amendment has been held to prohibit school officials from “reaching beyond 
the schoolyard” to inflict discipline which might otherwise be appropriate within the school 
setting. Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 207 (3d Cir. 2011). See 
e.g., Id. at 207 (punishment of a student for creating a fake, offensive internet profile of his 
principal while off-campus transcends the First Amendment right of expression); Killion v. 
Franklin Regional School District, 136 F.Supp.2d 446 (W.D. Pa. 2001) (school exceeded its 
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constitutional bounds when it suspended a student for lewd comments he made about an athletic 
director in an email sent to classmates). 
 In general, schools cannot infringe on students’ right to “free and unrestricted expression” 
as provided by the First Amendment. Shanley v. Ne. Indep. Sch. Dist., Bexar Cty., Tex., 462 F.2d 
960, 969 (5th Cir. 1972).  However, the United States Supreme Court, in recognizing students’ 
First Amendment rights should be applied in light of the school’s “special characteristics,” 
established a general rule for regulating student speech within the school setting in Tinker. Tinker, 
393 U.S. at 506.  In this landmark case, students wearing black armbands at school in protest of 
the Vietnam War, a symbolic act “closely akin to pure speech,” were constitutionally protected 
under the First Amendment. Id. at 505.  The Supreme Court found the school’s policy prohibiting 
the wearing of black armbands at school was merely an effort to avoid possible controversy 
resulting from the expression.  Therefore, the school’s actions were unreasonable, as “fear or 
apprehension of disturbance” does not justify an infringement of one’s freedom of speech. Id. at 
504-510.  The Court held that in the absence of an actual or nascent, material and substantial 
interference with the school’s work or a collision with the rights of other students to be secure and 
to be let alone, the school’s prohibition of the speech was not constitutionally permissible. Id. at 
508, 511.   Courts thereafter applied this standard, which has become known as the Tinker test, to 
determine whether a school may regulate student speech within the school setting without violating 
students’ First Amendment rights. 
 Following Tinker, three Supreme Court cases established categorical exceptions to the 
Tinker standard, thus creating “types” of on-campus speech a school may regulate. See, Bethel 
Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986) (offensively lewd and indecent speech on school 
property); Hazelwood Sch. Dict. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988) (school-sponsored speech or 
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expressive activities reasonably believed to bear the school’s imprimatur); Morse v. Frederick, 
551 U.S. 393 (2007) (speech promoting illegal drug use or other unique threats to the physical 
safety of students).  
 In Fraser, a student delivering a nominating speech at a school assembly violated the 
school’s “disruptive-conduct rule” when he used an elaborate, graphic, and explicit sexual 
metaphor to refer to his candidate. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 678-679.  In congruence with earlier 
Supreme Court decisions which recognized free speech rights may be limited where the speech is 
sexually explicit and the audience may include children, the Court held that prohibiting offensively 
lewd and indecent speech at school does not violate a student’s First Amendment rights, because 
the rights of students in public school are not “automatically coextensive” with that of “adults in 
other settings” and schools must be considerate of the “sensibilities of [other] students.” Id. at 681, 
682.  The Court concluded that in the interest of protecting minors from exposure to lewd and 
vulgar speech, the school acted within its permissible authority when it disciplined the student for 
his offensively lewd and indecent speech. Id. at 685.  
 In Kuhlmeier, a high school principle deleted articles from a student newspaper, which he 
believed impinged upon the privacy rights of students affected by divorce and teen-pregnancy. 
Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 263.  The students responsible for the articles alleged the censorship 
violated their First Amendment rights.  However, the Court decided because the school newspaper 
was part of the school curriculum, rather than a “public forum,” the school may regulate speech 
“disseminated under its auspices” or appearing to represent the school. Id. at 271.  The Court held 
that school officials may, without offending the First Amendment, exercise editorial control over 
student speech in “school-sponsored expressive activities,” as long as their actions reasonably 
relate to “legitimate pedagogical concerns.” Id. at 273.   
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 In Morse, a high school principal suspended a student for displaying a “BONG HiTS 4 
JESUS” banner at an off-campus, school-sanctioned event, an act which violated school policy 
because it encouraged illegal drug use. Morse, 551 U.S. at 397.  The Court determined the student’s 
conduct constituted on-campus speech because it occurred during normal school hours at “an 
approved social event,” and thus concluded the principal did not violate the student’s right to free 
speech by confiscating the banner and disciplining him. Id. at 400-403.  The Court held school 
officials may, consistent with the First Amendment, restrict student speech at a school event, when 
that speech is reasonably viewed as promoting illegal drug use. Id. at 403.   
These three exceptions to the Tinker standard enable schools to regulate on-campus speech 
which may not meet the substantial disruption factor of the Tinker test.  On-campus speech falling 
outside of these categories may be governed by Tinker. Killion, 136 F.Supp.2d at 453.  However, 
all of these are limited in their application capacity outside the school setting.  
B. Tinker and its Progeny Apply only to Student Speech within the School Setting, 
Unless Student Speech Outside the School Setting is Violent, Threatening, or 
Harassing and Intentionally Directed at the School Community  
 
Tinker and its progeny involved student speech within the school setting, and thus 
established specific rules and speech regulation standards for on-campus speech.  However, the 
regulatory power of Tinker and its progeny loses its viability when student speech occurs outside 
the school setting, a limitation alluded to in Fraser when the Court notes the student’s speech 
would have been protected had he given it under different circumstances, where the school’s 
interests were not involved. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 689. See also, J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain 
Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 932 (3d Cir. 2011) (court refuses to justify school’s disciplining the 
student’s lewd and offensive speech based on Fraser, because Fraser does not apply to off-campus 
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speech); Killion, 136 F.Supp.2d at 456 (lewd and obscene speech in an email to other students is 
not punishable under Fraser because it was created off-campus).  
Similarly, with the exception of off-campus speech that is violent, threatening, or harassing 
and intentionally directed at the school community, many district and circuit courts have declined 
to apply Tinker to off-campus speech which does not reach within the school setting or cause a 
substantial disruption. See, e.g., Layshock, 650 F.3d at 207 (school district cannot punish a student 
under Tinker for creating an offensive online profile of his principal while off-campus when the 
speech did not disrupt the school environment and was not related to a school event); Shanley, 462 
F.2d at 975 (school cannot prohibit dissemination of student newspaper when distribution occurs 
off-campus and does not substantially disrupt school activities); Emmett v. Kent Sch. Dist. No. 415, 
92 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1090 (W.D. Wash. 2000) (regulation of an unofficial high school homepage 
containing mock obituaries of friends, which was created from home and intended for a student 
audience, is beyond the school’s control when there was no intent to threaten or intimidate other 
students and the web page did not cause a substantial disruption); Thomas, 607 F.2d at 1045 
(school cannot punish students for an offensive and obscene newspaper publication when use of 
school property is minimal and the newspaper was distributed outside the school).  
In addition to identifying the limitations of Tinker and its progeny, subsequent circuit and 
district courts cases have helped further define and distinguish “on-campus” and “off-campus” 
speech, discern the line between the two, and establish general guidelines as to when off-campus 
speech may be subject to Tinker and its progeny.   For instance, on-campus speech, as established 
in Tinker and its progeny, involves speech that occurs at school or at a school-sponsored activity, 
or is somehow affiliated with the school.  Off-campus speech, on the other hand, originates and 
exists outside the school setting and does not appear to represent the school.  In certain situations, 
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however, Tinker may apply to off-campus speech – that is, depending on the nature of the speech 
and the intent of the speaker.  
Although the Second, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits have all applied Tinker to 
off-campus speech, it is significant to note that, in most of those cases, the speech at issue was 
violent, threatening, or harassing and intentionally directed at the school community. See, 
Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ. of Weedsport Cent. Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 34, 40 (2d Cir. 2007) 
(disciplining a student for a potentially threatening IM icon graphic, which suggested a teacher be 
shot and killed, that he shared online to friends is permissible under Tinker because the violent and 
threatening speech was intentionally communicated to other students, making it reasonably 
foreseeable the communication would cause a disruption); Kowalski v. Berkley Cty. Sch., 652 F.3d 
565, 574 (4th Cir. 2011) (Tinker applied to online student speech which harassed, bullied, and 
intimidated a specific student, because the nature of the speech and student’s intent to 
communicate the messages made it reasonably foreseeable the speech would reach the school and 
create a risk of substantial disruption); Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379, 396 (5th Cir. 
2015) (Tinker governs when off-campus student speech about a school shooting is intentionally 
directed at the school community and may be reasonably understood by school officials to threaten, 
harass, and intimidate a member of the school); D.J.M ex rel. D.M. v. Hannibal Pub. Sch. Dist. 
No. 60, 647 F.3d 754 (8th Cir. 2011) (Tinker applies to off-campus speech which involves threats 
of shooting specific students on campus when the speaker intentionally communicates the threat 
and the risk of substantial disruption at school is reasonably foreseeable); Wynar v. Douglas Cty. 
Sch. Dist., 728 F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir. 2013) (a school may restrict student speech under Tinker, 
regardless of whether it is on-campus or off-campus speech, when faced with an identifiable threat 
of violence intentionally directed at the school or any of its members); LaVine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., 
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257 F.3d 981, 989 (9th Cir. 2001) (Tinker applies to off-campus student speech about a school 
shooting which was intentionally brought to school by the student, because it was reasonable for 
the school to forecast a substantial disruption).  Thus, the speech in those cases created an actual 
or reasonably foreseeable risk of substantial disruption to the school environment, which made the 
application of Tinker appropriate.  
The above-referenced court decisions in the various circuit and district courts indicate the 
application of Tinker and its progeny are limited to on-campus speech, off-campus speech within 
the school setting, and off-campus speech which is violent, threatening, or harassing and 
intentionally directed at the school community.  Therefore, such factors are required for Tinker 
and its progeny to apply to off-campus speech.   Absent these factors, speech outside of the school 
setting is protected by the First Amendment.  For example, where intent for the speech to reach 
the school community or to do harm is lacking, the school may not be justified in disciplining a 
student for his off-campus speech. See, Emmett, 92 F. Supp. 2d at 1090 (W.D. Wash. 2000) 
(disciplining a student for his unofficial high school webpage which contained mock obituaries of 
friends was not permissible, because although the intended audience was fellow students, there 
was no intent to threaten or intimidate); Layshock, 650 F.3d at 208 (although the student intended 
for the mock MySpace profile of his school principal to be seen by other students, he did not intend 
to harm or intimidate the principal).  Further, the “intent” element is not satisfied when another 
individual brings the speaker’s speech to school. See, Porter v. Ascension Par. Sch. Bd., 393 F.3d 
608 (5th Cir. 2004) (student was protected under the First Amendment when a drawing he created 
from home, depicting a violent siege on the school, was brought to school without his knowledge 
or permission); Killion, 136 F. Supp. 2d at 456-457 (punishing a student for an offensive “Top 
Ten” list about a school official, which was created from home and emailed to other students and 
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brought to school without his knowledge or permission by another individual, is not permissible 
under Tinker or Fraser, because Fraser does not apply to off-campus speech and the speech did 
not cause a substantial disruption).  Thus, it is clear that a speaker’s intent is an integral part in 
determining whether the off-campus speech should be subject to Tinker and its progeny. Bell, 799 
F.3d at 395. 
There is no support in these decisions that Tinker and its progeny may be applied to student 
speech outside the school setting when the speech does not pose an actual or reasonably 
foreseeable threat or danger to the school based on the violent, threatening, or harassing nature of 
the speech, and when there is no intent for the speech to reach the school community or to do harm.  
In Michael Naranjo’s case, the speech originated and existed outside the school setting, there was 
no intent for the speech to reach within the school setting, the nature of the speech was not violent 
or threatening, and the speech did not pose and actual or foreseeable threat or danger to the school 
which would make a substantial disruption reasonably foreseeable.  Clearly, Michael’s speech 
does not meet the required elements necessary to apply Tinker and its progeny.  Therefore, 
Michael’s speech should be governed by the First Amendment, not Tinker and its progeny.  
II. The Application of Tinker and its Progeny in Michael’s Case does not Permit 
Regulation of the Speech by the Nero School District, because Michael’s Speech 
does not Satisfy the Standard for Tinker or its Progeny. 
 
If Tinker and its progeny applied in Michael’s case, the Nero School District (“District”) 
would not be able to regulate his speech, because the Tinker standard has not been met and the 
speech does not fall within the exceptions to Tinker.  As previously mentioned, student speech 
may be regulated under Fraser, Kuhlmeier, or Morse when the Tinker standard has not been met.  
However, here, Kuhlmeier and Morse would not apply, because the Facebook page neither appears 
to represent the school, nor promotes illegal drug use or other reckless behavior.  There would 
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perhaps be some discussion with regard to the application of Fraser, given that the drawing that 
appeared at school has been characterized by the District Court, Southern District of Everystate as 
“incendiary and provocative.”  But the details of the facts are lacking in this area, and without 
more information, one cannot properly determine whether the drawing reaches the level of lewd, 
vulgar, and indecency necessary to invoke Fraser.  Additionally, while the Court’s decision in 
Fraser is highly influential in the realm of student speech cases and deserves the utmost respect 
and deference, it is worth noting the decision was made twenty years ago and the habits and 
manners of civility and the moral values of society have since changed with regard to what is 
considered lewd and indecent. 
According to the analysis above, the application of Tinker is limited to on-campus speech, 
off-campus speech which reaches the school setting, and off-campus speech which is violent, 
threatening, or harassing and intentionally directed at the school community.  The facts of 
Michael’s case do not support the application of Tinker under these criteria.  First, Michael’s 
Facebook page was created online from home and not during school hours.  Although he accessed 
it regularly and occasionally added new posts or comments, he never did so at school or during 
school hours. In this sense, Michael’s speech is considered off-campus speech, because it 
originated and existed outside the school setting. See, Layshock, 650 F.3d at 219 (fake MySpace 
page of principal created from home is off-campus speech); Bell, 799 F.3d at 391 (rap song created 
from home and posted online constitutes off-campus speech).  
Second, Michael’s off-campus speech did not reach the school setting.  Michael never 
advertised or displayed the Facebook page at school.  Although other students may have accessed 
the webpage at school from their personal electronic devices, they did so by their own free will 
and not at the behest of Michael.  Based on the circuit and district courts’ lack of attention to this 
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type of “appearance” at school, it is reasonable to infer such appearances, as momentary and 
solitary as they can be, do not constitute speech presence within the school setting.  Thus, in the 
cases involving off-campus speech which was neither violent, threatening, nor harassing, like 
Michael’s speech, the courts typically recognized such speech as appearing on campus only when 
a physical, hard copy of the speech appeared at school.  Even then, disciplinary actions against the 
students were not permitted, because off-campus speech brought on campus does not necessarily 
give the school the right to discipline the student for his speech. Killion, 136 F.Supp.2d at 455. 
See, Id. at 456 (student was not disciplined until hard copies of his “Top Ten” email were found 
in the teachers’ lounge at school); J.S. ex rel. Snyder, 650 F.3d at 932 (student did not get in trouble 
for her lewd and indecent, fake MySpace profile of her principal until the principal had her bring 
a copy of it to school).  
A physical copy of one of Michael’s sexually explicit drawings was brought to school 
without his knowledge or permission by an unidentified individual.  While this may qualify as 
appearing within the school setting, courts have distinguished between speech intentionally 
brought to school by the speaker and speech brought to school by an individual other than the 
speaker, as only the former can be objectively perceived as a manifestation of the speaker’s intent 
to bring the speech within the school setting. Compare LaVine, 257 F.3d at 986 (student 
purposefully brought his off-campus speech, a poem about school shooting, to school, where it 
became subject to Tinker), with Porter, 393 F.3d at 615 (student’s drawing depicting school siege, 
which was brought to school without his knowledge, was protected by the First Amendment 
because the speech was not intentionally brought on the school premises, nor directed at the 
school).  Because Michael’s speech only appeared at school unintentionally, his speech is still 
considered off-campus speech, as the fact that a copy of the online material is brought to school 
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does not transform off-campus speech into on-campus speech. J.S. ex rel. Snyder, 650 F.3d at 932.  
Furthermore, this fact shows that Michael did not intended for his speech to reach the school 
setting. 
Third, Michael’s speech was directed at a certain group of students at the school, as he 
created the Facebook group to create awareness about the school’s hiring an allegedly anti-LGBT 
teacher and to provide a forum for discussion of the matter; but, it was not intentionally directed 
at the school community at large, as he did not intend for it to be brought to school.  The Fifth 
Circuit recognized the importance of this difference in Porter.  There, the student’s off-campus 
speech was protected, because the court found that by not purposefully taking the drawing to 
school himself, the student did not intend for his drawing to reach the school community. Porter, 
393 F.3d at 615.  As Bell explains, intent for the off-campus speech to reach the school community 
buttressed by deliberate action to bring about that result supports the application of Tinker. Bell, 
799 F.3d at 395.  Absent that, however, and the speaker should receive the full protection afforded 
by the First Amendment for off-campus speech. Since Michael did not intend for his drawing or 
the contents of the Facebook page to reach the school, he did not intentionally direct his speech at 
the school community.  Thus, his speech should be treated as off-campus speech, and protected by 
the First Amendment.  Even if, however, Michael’s speech was intentionally directed at the school 
community, this factor alone does not automatically make off-campus speech subject to Tinker. 
See, Thomas, 607 F.2d 1043 (student-created “offensive, indecent, and obscene” newspaper was 
intentionally directed at the school community and appeared on campus, but was still classified as 
off-campus speech and not subject to Tinker).  Whether speech is intentionally directed at the 
school community can be an important factor in cases involving violent, threatening, or harassing 
speech, since Tinker may govern when off-campus speech is intentionally directed at the school 
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community and reasonably understood “to threaten, harass, and intimidate,” Bell, 799 F.3d at 396.  
However, Michael’s speech is neither violent, threatening, nor harassing.  
Finally, if Tinker is applicable, the District cannot regulate Michael’s speech unless it 
shows the speech caused a material or substantial disruption of, or interference with, school 
activities, or led school officials to reasonably anticipate a substantial disruption. Tinker, 393 U.S. 
at 509.  The school must also show its actions were prompted by more than a desire to avoid the 
discomfort and unpleasantness that may accompany unfavorable student speech, as this is not 
enough to justify the prohibition of student speech. Id.  The District has not shown Michael’s 
speech caused an actual or reasonably foreseeable disruption.  Neither the Facebook page nor 
drawing posed any sort of danger to the school community, and none of the teachers, 
administrators, or students felt they were in danger.  Although the drawing found on campus 
alerted school officials to the existence of the Facebook page, which they found inappropriate, any 
disturbance caused by the web page or drawing was minimal.  After all, the Facebook page was 
only “active” for three school days before school officials asked Michael to delete it.  It is unlikely 
the webpage attracted extensive attention in such a short period of time.  Thus, it appears the 
actions of Nero school officials were not instigated by any urgent need to protect the safety of its 
school members or mitigate a substantial disruption, but rather prompted by their displeasure with 
the content of the Facebook page.  However, “[d]isliking or being upset” over a student’s speech 
is “not an acceptable justification” for restricting speech under Tinker. Beussink ex rel. Beussink 
v. Woodland R-IV Sch. Dist., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1180 (E.D. Mo. 1998).  Furthermore, the few 
complaints the school received about the Facebook page are not unlike any other complaints the 
school must deal with on a regular basis; and, no student or teacher has left the school or threatened 
to leave as a result of Michael’s speech.  Based on these facts, the substantial disruption element 
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of the Tinker standard has not been met.  Therefore, the District should not be allowed to regulate 
Michael’s speech.  
 
CONCLUSION 
Michael’s speech is protected by the First Amendment and the District has not satisfied the 
elements necessary to permit regulation of the speech under Tinker and its progeny.  Because 
Michael’s speech constitutes student speech outside the setting, Tinker and its progeny are not 
applicable.  While Tinker may apply to off-campus speech which is violent, threatening, or 
harassing and intentionally directed at the school community, Michael’s speech does not meet this 
qualification.  Even if Tinker and its progeny were applicable, Michael’s speech is not 
characteristic of the type of speech which may be restricted under Kuhlmeier, Morse, or Fraser; 
and, his speech did not cause a material or substantial disruption, which is necessary to restrict the 
speech under Tinker.  Therefore, regardless of whether Michael’s speech is considered on-campus 
or off-campus student speech, it is protected under the First Amendment and the District is not 
constitutionally permitted to regulate it.  For the foregoing reasons, Respondent prays this Court 
affirm the judgment of the Fifteenth Circuit Court of Appeals and render judgment in favor of 
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